The monetary approach to exchange rates : its historical evolution and role in policy debates by Thomas M. Humphrey
THE MONETARY  APPROACH  TO 
ITS HISTORICAL  EVOLUTION  AND 
Thomas  M.  Humphrey 
One  of  the  oldest  debates  in  economics  is  that  be- 
tween  the  monetary  and  balance  of  payments  ap- 
proaches  to  the  determination  of  exchange  rates  in  a 
flexible  exchange  rate  regime.  The  monetary  ap- 
proach  attributes  exchange  rate  movements  largely 
to  actual  and  anticipated  changes  in  relative  money 
stocks.  It  stresses  a  channel  of  causation  running 
from  money  to  domestic  prices  to  the  exchange  rate. 
By  contrast,  the  balance  of  payments  approach  holds 
autonomous  nonmonetary  factors  affecting  individ- 
ual  items  in  the  balance  of  payments  to  blame.  It 
stresses  a  causal  channel  running  from  real  factors 
through  the  balance  of  payments  to  the  exchange 
rate  and  thence  to  domestic  prices  and  sometimes 
further  to  the  money  supply.  Both  views  underlie 
current  discussions  of  the  weakness  of  the  dollar- 
the  monetary  approach  holding  excessive  U.  S. 
money  growth  to  blame  while  the  balance  of  pay- 
ments  view  sees  excessive  oil  imports  and  the  slug- 
gish  foreign  demand  for  U.  S.  exports  as the  culprits. 
Although  the  difference  between  these  two  rival  ap- 
proaches  is  fairly  well  understood,  what  is  not  so 
fully  appreciated  is  that  the  current  debate  between 
them  is  largely  a  repetition  of  earlier  disputes  going 
back  more  than  200  years. 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  trace  the  emer- 
gence  and  development  of  the  monetary  approach  in 
three  of  these  early  controversies,  namely  (1)  the 
Swedish  bullionist  controversy  of  the  1750’s,  (2)  the 
English  bullionist  controversy  of  the  early  19th  cen- 
tury,  and  (3)  the  German  inflation  controversy 
during  and  immediately  following  World  War  I.1 
These  debates  are  crucial  to  the  evolution  of  the 
monetary  approach  in  two  respects.  First,  they 
established  the  analytical  foundations  of  the  mone- 
tary  approach.  These  foundations  consist  of  a  quan- 
* This  article  draws  from  the  author’s  paper  of  the  same 
title  in  the  forthcoming  volume  A  Monetary  Approach  to 
International  Adjustment,  ed.  by  Bluford  H.  Putnam  and 
D.  Sykes  Wilford  (New  York:  Praeger  Publishers,  1978). 
1 For  another  treatment  of  the  role  of  the  monetary  and 
the  balance  of  payments  approaches  in  these  debates  see 
Johan  Myhrman,  “Experiences  of  Flexible  Exchange 
Rates  in  Earlier  Periods:  Theories,  Evidence,  and  a  New 
View,”  Scandanavian  Journal  of  Economics,  78,  no.  2, 
(1976),  169-196. 
tity  theory  relationship  linking  money  to  prices,  a 
purchasing  power  parity  relationship  linking  prices 
to  the  exchange  rate,  and  an  expectations  theory 
specifying  how  anticipations  of  future  money  stocks 
are  formed  and  how  they  influence  the  exchange  rate. 
Second,  the’ earlier  debates  are  the  origin  of  current 
monetarist  policy  prescriptions  for  strengthening  the 
dollar.  These  prescriptions  call  for  the  gradual  de- 
celeration  of  the  growth  rate  of  the  money  supply so 
as to  eliminate  the  excess  supply  of  dollars  alleged  to 
be  the  basic  cause  of  the  fall  of  the  internal  and  ex- 
ternal  value  of  the  dollar. 
The  Swedish  Bullion  &  Controversy  (1755-1765:) 
One  of  the  earliest  debates  in  which  the  monetary 
approach  played  a  leading  role  was  the  Swedish  bul 
lionist  controversy  of  the  mid-1700’s.2  The  events 
precipitating  the  debate  were  as  follows.  In  1745 
Sweden  shifted  from  a metallic  monetary  system  with 
fixed  exchange  rates  to an  inconvertible  paper  system 
with  flexible  exchange  rates.  The  suspension  of 
convertibility  was  followed  by  a  steady  rise  in  the 
prices  of  commodities  and  foreign  exchange.  A 
debate  then  arose  between  the  two  main  political 
parties  of  the  time-the  so-called  Hats  and  the  Caps, 
respectively-over  the  cause  of  these  price  increases. 
The  Hat  Political  Party  The  Hats  advanced  the 
balance  of  payments  theory,  blaming  both  the  exter- 
nal and  the  internal  depreciation  of the  Swedish  mark 
on  Sweden’s  adverse  trade  balance.  Specifically,  they 
held  that  the  adverse  trade  balance  had  produced  a. 
depreciating  exchange,  that  exchange  depreciation 
had  rendered  imported  goods  more  expensive,  and 
that  the  rise  in  import  prices  had  spread  to  the  rest 
of  the  economy  thereby  raising  the  general  level  of 
prices.  Here  is an  early  example  of  the  tendency  of 
balance  of  payments  theorists  (1)  to  attribute  both 
domestic  inflation  and  exchange  depreciation  to  ex- 
ternal  nonmonetary  shocks  and  (2)  to  assert  a  chain 
of  causation  running  from  the  exchange  rate  to 
prices  rather  than  vice  versa  as  in  the  monetary  ap- 
*On  what  follows,  see  Robert  V.  Eagly,  The  Swedish 
Bullionist  Controversy  (Philadelphia:  American  Philo- 
sophical  Society,  1971). 
2  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JULY/AUGUST  1978 proach.  Consistent  with  their  balance  of  payments 
view,  the  Hats  prescribed  export  promotion  and  im- 
port  restriction  schemes  as  remedies  for  inflation  and 
eschange  rate  depreciation.  Nothing  was  said  about 
money. 
The  Cap  Party  The  opposition  Cap  party  em- 
phatically  rejected  the  Hats’  balance  of  payments 
theory  and  instead  pointed  to  the  importance  of  the 
monetary  factor.  They  blamed  both  domestic  infla- 
tion  and  the  external  depreciation  of  the  Swedish 
mark  largely  on  the  Riksbank’s  overissue  of  bank- 
notes  following  the  suspension  of convertibility.  They 
favored  a  policy  of  monetary  contraction  to  roll  back 
prices  and  the  exchange  rate  to  pre-inflation  levels. 
Their  position  can  be  summarized  by  the  relationship 
(1)  E  =  E(M) 
expressing  the  exchange  rate  E  (defined  as  the  do- 
mestic  currency  price  of  a  unit  of  foreign  currency) 
as  a function  of  the  domestic  money  stock  M. 
The  preceding  was  not  tine only  explanation  offered 
by  the  Caps.  They  also  adhered  to  an  evil-speculator 
theory  of  exchange  rate  movements.  This  conspiracy 
theory  is  no  part  of  the  monetary  approach.  For 
that  reason  the  Caps  cannot  be  considered  as  full- 
fledged  consistent  advocates  of  -the  monetary  ap- 
proach. 
Pehr  Niclas  Christiernin  One  participant  who 
did  articulate  the  monetary  view  was  Pehr  Niclas 
Christiernin,  an academic  economist  at the  University 
of Uppsala,  who  advanced  a  quantity  theory  explana- 
tion  of  the  transmission  mechanism  linking  money 
with  the  exchange  rate.  In  his  Lectures  on  the  High 
Price  of  Foreign  Exchange  in  Sweden  (1761), 
Christiernin  maintained  that  the  chief  cause  of  cur- 
rency  depreciation  was  an  overissue  of  banknotes  by 
the  Riksbank  and  that  causation  flowed  from  money 
to  spending  to all  prices,  including  the  prices  of com- 
modities  and  foreign  exchange.  He  saw  monetary 
expansion  as  stimulating  demand.  Part  of  the  de- 
mand  pressure  falls  on  domestic  commodity  markets 
raising  prices  there.  The  rest  spills  over  into  the 
current  account  of  the  balance  of  payments  in  the 
form  of increased  demand  for  imports.  The  resulting 
import  deficit  then  puts  upward  pressure  on  the 
exchange  rate  which  consequently  rises  to  restore 
equilibrium  in  the  current  account.  Clearly,  money- 
induced  changes  in  total  spending  constitute  the 
driving  force  in  Christiernin’s  version  of  the  trans- 
mission  mechanism  running  from  money  to  the  ex- 
change  rate.  This  component  has  been  a  hallmark  of 
the  monetary  approach  ever  since. 
As  for  policy  recommendations,  Christiernin  was 
opposed  to  the  Caps’  plan  to  restore  the  exchange 
rate  to  its  original  pre-inflation  level  via  contraction 
of  the  note  issue.  His  opposition  stemmed  from  his 
belief  that  prices  adjusted  sluggishly  in  response  to 
deflationary  pressure  so  that  the  monetary  contrac- 
tion  required to  restore  the  exchanges  to parity  would 
bring  painful  declines  in  output  and  employment 
rather  than  the  desired  price  decreases.  For  this 
reason  he  recommended  stabilizing  the  exchange  rate 
at  the  level  established  during  the  inflation  rather 
than  restoring  it  to  the  pre-inflation  level3  Un- 
fortunately,  his  advice  was  ignored  and  the  Caps 
enacted  a deflationary  policy  that  resulted  in  the  very 
drop  in output  and  employment  that  he had  predicted. 
The  English  Bullionist  Controversy  (1797-1819) 
The  monetary  and  balance  of  payments  theories 
clashed  again  in  the  famous  controversy  over  the 
cause  of  the  fall  of  the  British  pound  following  the 
Bank  of  England’s  suspension  of  the  convertibility  of 
banknotes  into  gold  during  the  Napoleonic  wars.4 
As  in  the  earlier  Swedish  controversy,  one  side 
blamed  currency  depreciation  on  the  central  bank’s 
overissue  of  notes  while  the  other  side  blamed  it  on 
an  adverse  balance  of  payments.  This  time,  however, 
the  proponents  of  the  monetary  and  balance  of  pay- 
ments  views  were  known  as  the  bullionists  and  the 
antibullionists,  respectively. 
The  bullionists  did  more  than  any  group  before  or 
since  to  develop  and  clarify  the  monetary  view.  The 
so-called  strict  bullionists  crystallized  the  theory  in 
rigorous  form  and  the  moderate  bullionists  refined 
and  extended  it.  The  strict  bullionists  included 
William  Boyd.  David  Ricardo,  and  John  Wheatley 
while  the  moderate  bullionists  included  William 
Blake,  Francis  Horner,  William  Huskisson,  and 
above  all,  Henry  Thornton. 
The  Strict  Bullionists:  Ricardo  and  Wheatley 
The  strict  bullionists  made  several  major  contribu- 
tions  to  the  monetary  approach.  They  were  the  first 
to  specify  both  the  quantity  theory  and  purchasing 
power  parity  links  in  the  transmission  mechanism 
connecting  money  and  the  exchange  rate.  In  addi- 
tion,  they  stated  the  monetary  approach  in  its  most 
rigid  and  uncompromising  form,  asserting  that,  under 
conditions  of  inconvertibility  where  money  cannot 
3 Ibid,  pp.  27-29,  34. 
4 On  the  English  bullionist  controversy  see  Denis  P. 
O’Brien,  The  Classical  Economists  (London:  Oxford 
University  Press,  1975),  pp.  147-153  and  Jacob  Viner, 
Studies  in  the  Theory  of  International  Trade  (New  York: 
Augustus  Kelley, 1965),  pp.  119-170. 
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in  exact  proportion  with  changes  in  the  money 
supply.  They  arrived  at  this  latter  conclusion  via 
the  following  route. 
First,  they  assumed  that  under  inconvertibility  do- 
mestic  prices  P  vary  in  strict  proportion  with  the 
quantity  of  money  in  circulation  M.  This  of  course 
is the  rigid  version  of  the  quantity  theory  which  may 
be  expressed  as 
(2)  P  =  kM 
where  k  is a  constant  equal  to  the  ratio  of  the  circu- 
lation  velocity  of  money  to  real  output,  both  treated 
as  constants  by  the  strict  bullionists. 
Second,  they  maintained  that  under  inconvertibility 
the  exchange  rate  E  moves  in  proportion  to  the  ratio 
of  domestic  to  foreign  prices  P/P*.  First  enunciated 
by  Wheatley  in  1803,  this  proposition  is  the  famous 
purchasing  power  parity  doctrine,  so  christened  by 
Gustav  Cassel  who  rediscovered  it  more  than  100 
years  later  in  1918.  The  Wheatley-Ricardo-Cassel 
purchasing  power  parity  condition  may  be  written  as 
(3)  E  =  P/P* 
implying  that  external  currency  valuations  derive 
from  their  real  internal  values  and  that  the  general 
price  level  and  its  counterpart,  the  purchasing  power 
of  money,  are  everywhere  the  same  when  converted 
into  a  common  unit  at  the  equilibrium  rate  of  ex- 
change. 
Third,  they  assumed  that  the  foreign  price  com- 
ponent  P*  of the  purchasing  power  parity  ratio  was  a 
constant  equal  to  the  given  world  bullion  price  of 
commodities  so  that  exchange  rate  movements  re- 
flected  corresponding  movements  in  domestic  paper 
money  prices  only.  Given  this  assumption  the  ex- 
change  rate  is  a  good  proxy  for  domestic  prices  and 
may  be  expressed  as 
(4)  E  =  P 
assuming  the  constant  foreign  price  level  is  “nor- 
malized”  and  set  equal  to  unity.5 
Finally  they  substituted  the  exchange  rate  proxy 
for  the  price  variable  in  the  quantity  theory  relation- 
ship,  thereby  obtaining  the  result 
(5)  E=kM 
5Due  to  the  unavailability  of  reliable  general  price  in- 
dexes,  the  Classical  economists  also  used  the  paper  money 
price  of  bullion  as  an  empirical  proxy  for  the  commodity 
price  level.  Accordingly,  they  interpreted  a  rise  in  the 
market  price  of  gold  above  its  mint  price  as  both  a  sign 
and  measure  of  general  price  inflation  and  therefore  of 
the  need  for  monetary  contraction. 
which  states  that  the  exchange  rate  varies  in  exact 
proportion  with  the  money  supply.  On  this  basis 
they  were  able  to conclude  that  a rise  in  the  exchange 
rate  above  its  gold  parity  constituted  both  proof  and 
measure  of  overissue  of  inconvertible  currency.  In 
other  words,  if  the  exchange  rate  stood  5  percent 
above  its  gold  parity,  then  this  was  prima  facie  evi- 
dence  that  the  note  issue  was  5 percent  above  what 
it  would  have  been  under  convertibility.  This  was 
most  clearly  stated  by  Ricardo  who  wrote 
If  a  country  used  paper  money  not  exchangeable 
for  specie,  and,  therefore,  not  regulated  by  any 
fixed  standard,  the  exchanges  in that  country  might 
deviate  from  par  in  the  same  proportion  as  its 
money  might  be  multiplied  beyond  that  quantity 
which  would  have  been  allotted  to  it  by  general 
commerce,  if  .  .  .  the  precious  metals  had  been 
used.6 
Wheatley  extended  the  analysis  to  the  case  where 
both  countries  are  on  an  inconvertible  paper  stan- 
dard.  He  simply  substituted  quantity  theory  rela- 
tionships  for  both  the  domestic  and  foreign  price 
variables  in  Equation  3.  This  gave  him  the  result 
that  the  exchange  rate  varies  in  proportion  with 
relative  money  supplies,  i.e., 
(6)  E  =  kM/k*M*  =  K(M/M*) 
where  K  is  the  ratio  of  the  constants  k  and  k*. 
Wheatley  stated  this  result  when  he  declared  that 
“the  course  of exchange  is the  exclusive  criterion  [of] 
how  far  the  currency  of  one  [country]  is  increased 
beyond  the  currency  of  another."7 
Another  contribution  of  the  strict  bullionists  was 
their  assertion  that  exchange  rate  movements  are 
purely  a  monetary  phenomenon.  They  rejected  the 
antibullionist  argument  that  real  disturbances  to  the 
balance  of  payments-e.g.,  harvest  failures,  wartime 
disruption  of  trade,  military  expenditures  abroad,- 
were  responsible  for  the  fall  of  the  paper  pound 
during  the  Napoleonic  wars.  Regarding  supply 
shocks  and  foreign  remittances,  they  denied  that  such 
factors  could  influence  exchange  rates  even  in  the 
short  run.  Their  position  was  that  the  slightest  real 
pressure  on  the  exchange  rate  would,  by  making 
British  goods  cheaper  to  foreigners,  result  in  an 
instantaneous  expansion  of  exports  sufficient  to 
eliminate  the  pressure.  In  their  view,  an  adverse 
6 David  Ricardo,  The  Principles  of  Political  Economy 
and  Taxation  (London:  J.  M.  Dent  and  Sons,  1917),  p. 
151,  quoted  in  James  W.  Angell,  The  Theory  of  Inter- 
national  Prices  (New  York:  Augustus  Kelley,  1965),  p. 
69  n.  3.  Emphasis  added. 
7 John  Wheatley,  Remarks  on  Currency  and  Commerce 
(London:  Burton,  1803),  p.  207,  quoted  in  Angell  op.  cit., 
p.  52. 
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excess  issue  of  currency.  Ricardo  even  went  so  far 
as to  argue  that  even  if foreign  transfers  and  domestic 
crop  failures  did  affect  the  exchanges  by  reducing 
real  income  and  hence  the  demand  for  money,  the 
cause  of  exchange  depreciation  is  still  an  excess 
stock  of  money,  albeit  one  arising  from  a  reduction 
of money  demand  rather  than  an  expansion  of  money 
supply.  Ricardo’s  point  was  simply  that  real  factors 
could  only  affect  the  exchange  rate  through  shifts 
in  money  demand  not  offset  by  corresponding  shifts 
in  money  supply.  In  such  cases  the  latter  was  to 
blame  for  exchange  rate  movements.  The  notion  that 
all  factors  affecting  the  exchange  rate  must  do  so 
through  monetary  channels,  i.e.,  through  the  demand 
for  or  supply  of  money,  is  of  course  central  to  the 
modern  monetary  approach. 
Finally,  the  strict  bullionists  prescribed  monetary 
restraint  as the  only  cure  for  a depreciating  currency. 
They  held  that  a rise  in the  price  of  foreign  exchange 
constituted  an  infallible  sign  that  the  currency  was 
in  excess  and  must  be  contracted.  Ricardo  even 
defined  an  excess  issue  in  terms  of  exchange  depreci- 
ation,  thus  implying  a  single  unique  correct  money 
stock,  namely  one  associated  with  the  exchange  being 
at  its  former  gold  standard  parity.8 
The  Moderate  Bullionists:  Blake  and  Thornton 
The  moderate  bullionists  modified  the  strict  bullion- 
ists’  analysis  in  three  respects.  First,  they  pointed 
out  that  it  applies  to  long-run  equilibrium  situations 
but  not  necessarily  to  the  short  run.  Second,  while 
acknowledging  that  long-run  (persistent)  exchange 
depreciation  stemmed  solely  from  note  overissue, 
they  were  willing  to  admit  that  real  shocks  could 
affect  the  exchanges  in  the  short  run.  Their  position 
is  best  exemplified  by  William  Blake’s  distinction 
between  the  Real  and  the  Nominal  exchange.”  Ac- 
cording  to  Blake,  the  real  exchange  or  real  barter 
terms  of  trade  R  is  determined  by  nonmonetary 
factors-crop  failures,  unilateral  transfers,  structural 
changes  in  trade  and  the  like-that  affect  the  balance 
of  payments.  The  nominal  exchange,  N,  however, 
reflects  the  relative  purchasing  powers  of  different 
currencies  as  determined  by  their  relative  supplies 
M/M*.  Blake’s  analysis  can  be  summarized  by  the 
equation 
(7)  E  =  RN 
that  expresses  the  actual  exchange  rate  as  the  prod- 
uct  of  its  real  and  nominal  components,  both  of 
8  Regarding  the  policy  implications  of  the  Ricardian 
definition  of  excess,  see  O’Brien,  op.  cit.,  p.  138. 
9 On  Blake,  see  O’Brien,  op.  cit.,  pp.  150-151. 
which  contribute  to  exchange  rate  movements  in  the 
short  run.  Blake  maintained,  however,  that  in  the 
long  run  the  real  exchange  R  is  self-correcting  (i.e., 
returns  to  its  original  level)  and  that  only  the 
nominal  exchange  N  can  remain  permanently  de- 
pressed.  Therefore,  persistent  exchange  depreciation 
is a  sure  sign  of  an  excess  issue  of currency. 
The  third  modification  was  made  by  Henry  Thorn- 
ton,  whose  analysis  of  the  money-price-exchange 
rate  nexus  was  much  more  subtle  and  sophisticated 
than  that  of  the  strict  bullionists.  In  particular,  he 
argued  that  interest  rates  and  the  velocity  of  money 
enter  the  nexus,  that  velocity  is  extremely  variable 
in  the  short  run  owing  to  shifts  in  business  confi- 
dence,  and  that  this  variability  invalidates  the  rigid 
money-price-exchange  rate  linkage  postulated  by  the 
extreme  bullionists.10  In  terms  of  Equations  2 and  5 
he  argued  that  the  velocity-output  ratio  k is a variable 
determined  by  the  interest  rate  i  and  the  state  of 
business  confidence  c,  i.e., 
(8)  k  =  k(i,  c). 
Since  k  varies  in  the  short  run,  the  exchange  rate 
and  money  do  not  exhibit  exactly  equiproportional 
movements.  A  given  change  in  the  money  stock 
affects  k  as  well  as  the  exchange  rate.  In  the  long 
run,  however,  k is a constant  and  the  equiproportion- 
ality  proposition  holds. 
The  Antibullionists  Except  for  an  expectations 
mechanism,  the  bullionists  had  assembled  and  inte- 
grated  all  the  elements  of  the  monetary  theory  of 
exchange  rate  determination.  Compared  to  this  ac- 
complishment  the  contributions  of  the  antibullionists 
appear  pretty  meager  indeed.  They  attributed  ex- 
change  depreciation  and  domestic  inflation  solely  to 
real  factors-crop  failures,  overseas  military  expendi- 
tures  and  the  like-operating  through  the  balance  of 
payments.  They  correctly  asserted  that  the  exchange 
rate  is  determined  by  the  supply  and  demand  for 
foreign  exchange  arising  from  external  transactions. 
But  they  failed  to  see  that  an  important  factor  influ- 
encing  supply  and  demand  might  be  relative  price 
levels  determined  by  relative  money  stocks.  In  fact, 
they  rejected  all  monetary  explanations,  claiming  that 
banknote  expansion  could  not  affect  the  exchanges  in 
the  slightest.  They  thought  the  price  of  foreign  ex- 
change  could  rise  indefinitely  without  indicating  the 
existence  of  an  excess  note  issue.  As  for  policy 
recommendations,  they  urged  curtailment  of  imports 
and  overseas  expenditures  to  improve  the  balance  of 
10 Thornton’s  contribution  is  discussed  in  O’Brien,  op. 
cit.,  pp.  119-150. 
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that  any  conceivable  reduction  in  the  banknote  issue 
could  restore  the  exchanges  to  parity. 
Their  main  analytical  tool  was  the  real  bills  doc- 
trine,  which  they  employed  in an  unsuccessful  attempt 
to  refute  the  charge  that  the  Bank  of  England  had 
overissued  the  currency.  The  real  bills  doctrine  states 
that  money  can  never  be  issued  in  excess  as  long  as 
it  is  tied  to  bills  of  exchange  arising  from  real  trans- 
actions  in  goods  and  services.  Henry  Thornton, 
however,  exposed  the  fallacy  of  this  doctrine  when 
he  pointed  out  that  rising  prices  would  require  an 
ever-growing  volume  of  bills  to  finance  the  same 
level  of  real  transactions.  In  this  manner  inflation 
would  justify  the  monetary  expansion  necessary  to 
sustain  it  and  the  real  bills  criterion  would  not  effec- 
tively  limit  the  quantity  of  money  in  existence. 
Thornton’s  demonstration  of  the  invalidity  of  the 
real  bills  doctrine  constituted  a  victory  for  the  bul- 
lionists  and  for  the  monetary  approach  to  the  ex- 
change  rate.  The  victory,  however,  was  not  defini- 
tive.  For  when  the  debate  erupted  again  in  World 
War  I,  the  balance  of  payments  approach  was  the 
dominant  view. 
The  German  Inflation  Controversy  (1918-1923) 
The  debate  reopened  in  1918  when  Gustav  Cassel 
used  his  purchasing  power  parity  doctrine  together 
with  the  quantity  theory  to  attack  the  official  bal- 
ance  of  payments  explanation  of  the  wartime  fall  of 
the  German  mark.  Whereas  the  policymakers  blamed 
the  currency  depreciation  on  real  disturbances  to  the 
balance  of  payments-e.g.,  obstructions  to  German 
shipping,  wartime  disruption  of  trade  and  the  like- 
Cassel  blamed  it  on  excessive  monetary  expansion  in 
Germany  relative  to  that  of  her  trading  partners. 
Cassel’s  Critique  of  the  Balance  of  Payments 
Approach  Cassel’s  criticism  of  the  balance  of 
payments  theory  was  virtually  the  same  as  that  of  his 
strict  bullionist  counterparts,  Wheatley  and  Ricardo. 
Like  them,  he  argued  that  the  exchange  rate  is auto- 
matically  self-correcting  in  response  to  real  shocks 
to  the  balance  of  payments.  Therefore  the  theory  is 
incapable  of  accounting  for  persistent  exchange  rate 
depreciation  such  as  that  experienced  by  the  German 
mark  during  World  War  I. 
Regarding  the  operation  of  the  self-correcting  ex- 
change  rate  mechanism,  he  noted  that  when  balance 
of payments  disturbances  push  the  external  value  of a 
currency  below  its  internal  value,  the  currency  be- 
comes  undervalued  on  the  foreign  exchanges,  i.e.,  its 
domestic  purchasing  power  is  greater  than  indicated 
by  the  exchange  rate.  Such  undervaluation,  he  held, 
will  immediately  invoke  forces  returning  the  ex- 
change  rate  to  equilibrium.  For  as  soon  as  a  coun- 
try’s  currency  becomes  undervalued  relative  to  its 
purchasing  power  parity,  foreigners  will  find  it  prof- 
itable  to  purchase  the  currency  for  use  in  procuring 
goods  from  that  country.  The  resulting  increased 
demand  for  the  currency  will  bid  its  price  back  to 
the  level  of  purchasing  power  parity.  In  short,  devi- 
ations  of  the  exchange  rate  from  purchasing  power 
parity  generate  corrective  alterations  in  the  trade 
balance  that  eliminate  the  deviations.  Both  the  bal- 
ance  of  payments  and  the  exchange  rate  return 
swiftly  to  equilibrium.  Thus,  contrary  to  the  balance 
of payments  view,  external  nonmonetary  shocks  have 
no  lasting  impact  on  the  exchange  rate.ll  It  follows 
that  any  persistent  depreciation  must  be  due  to  ex- 
cessive  monetary  growth  that  raises  domestic  prices 
and  thereby  alters  the  purchasing  power  parity  or 
equilibrium  exchange  rate  itself.  In  this  connection 
he  repeated  Ricardo’s  dictum  that  an  excess  supply 
of  money,  whether  stemming  from  a  rise  in  money 
supply  or  a  fall  in  money  demand,  is  always  and 
everywhere  the  cause  of  exchange  rate  movements.‘” 
Cassel  also  criticized  the  proposition  that  exchange 
depreciation  causes  domestic  inflation  rather  than 
vice-versa.  He  acknowledged  that  currency  depreci- 
ations  relative  to  purchasing  power  parity  produce 
import  price  increases.  But  he  denied  that  these 
import  price  increases  could  be  transmitted  to  gen- 
eral  prices  provided  the  money  stock  and  hence  total 
spending  were  held  in  check.  He  maintained  that, 
given  monetary  stability,  the  rise  in  the  particular 
prices  of  imported  commodities  would  be  offset  by 
compensating  reductions  in  other  prices  leaving  the 
general  price  level  unchanged.  In  short,  he  denied 
that  causation  ran  from  the  exchange  rate  to  domestic 
prices  as  contended  by  the  balance  of  payments  ap- 
proach.13 
Hyperinflation  and  the  Reverse  Causality  Argu- 
ment  Despite  Cassel’s  forceful  and  vigorous 
attack,  the  debate  did  not  go  into  high  gear  until  the 
post-war  hyperinflation  episode  of  the  early  1920’s.14: 
11 Gustav  Cassel,  Money  and  Foreign  Exchange  After 
1914  (New  York:  MacMillan,  1922),  pp.  149,  164-165. 
12 Cassel  held  that  drops  in  output  and  the  demand  for 
money  could  not  affect  the  exchange  rate  if  offset  by 
corresponding  equiproportional  reductions  in  the  money 
supply.  Therefore  an  inappropriate  money  supply  was  to 
blame  for  exchange  rate  movements.  Ibid.,  pp.  61-62, 
168-169. 
13 Ibid.,  pp.  145,  167-168. 
14 What  follows  relies  heavily  on  Ellis’s  classic  survey  of 
the  German  inflation  controversy.  See  Howard  S.  Ellis, 
German  Monetary  Theory,  1905-1933  (Cambridge:  Har- 
vard  University  Press,  1934),  Chapters  12-16. 
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rose  to  fantastic  multiples  of  its  prewar  level  and 
everybody  wanted  to  know  why.  Advocates  of  the 
monetary  approach,  including  Cassel  and  his  follow- 
ers,  pointed  to  the  explosive  growth  of  the  money 
supply  as the  obvious  answer.  But  proponents  of  the 
balance  of  payments  approach  dismissed  the  mone- 
tary  factor  and  instead  attributed  exchange  depreci- 
ation  to  the  adverse  balance  of  payments  caused  by 
the  burden  of  reparations  payments  combined  with 
Germany’s  alleged  “fixed  need  for  imports”  and 
“absolute  inability  to  export.”  In  their  view,  money 
had  nothing  to  do  with  the  fall  of  the  mark.  On  the 
contrary,  they  claimed  that  causation  ran  from  the 
exchange  rate  to  money  rather  than  vice-versa.  They 
specified  the  following  causal  order  of  events  : depre- 
ciating  exchanges,  rising  import  prices,  rising  do- 
mestic  prices,  consequent  budget  deficits  and  in- 
creased  demand  for  money  requiring  an  accommo- 
dative  increase  in  the  money  supply.15 
Regarding  the  increase  in  the  money  supply,  they 
contended  that  the  exchange-induced  rise  in  prices 
created  a  need  for  money  on  the  part  of business  and 
government,  that  it  was  the  Reichsbank’s  duty  to 
meet  this  need,  and  that  it  could  do  so  without 
affecting  prices.  Far  from  seeing  currency  expan- 
sion  as  the  source  of  inflation,  they  argued  that  it 
was  the  solution  to  the  acute  shortage  of  money 
caused  by  skyrocketing  prices.  Here  is  the  familiar 
argument  that  the  central  bank  must  accommodate 
supply-shock  inflation  in  order  to  prevent  a  disas- 
trous  contraction  of  the  real  (price-deflated)  money 
stock.  German  proponents  of  the  balance  of  pay- 
ments  view,  however,  pushed  this  argument  to  ridic- 
ulous  extremes.  In  1923  when  the  Reichsbank  was 
already  issuing  currency  in  denominations  as  high  as 
100  trillion  marks,  Havenstein,  the  President  of  the 
Reichsbank,  expressed  hope  that  the  installation  of 
new  high  speed  currency  printing  presses  would 
help  overcome  the  money  shortage.  Citing  the  real 
bills  doctrine,  he  refused  to  believe  that  the  Reichs- 
15 Balance  of  payments  theorists  placed  the  blame  for 
government  deficits  financed  by  new  money  issues 
squarely  on  inflation  rather  than-  on  the  actions  of  the 
policy  authorities.  Inflation,  they  said,  caused  govern- 
ment  expenditures-which  were largely  fixed  in  real 
terms  and  thus  rose  in  step  with  prices-to  rise  faster 
than  revenues-which  were  fixed  in  nominal  terms  in 
the  short  run  and  thus  adjusted  sluggishly  to  inflation. 
The  result  was  an  inflation-induced  deficit  that  had  to 
be financed  by  money  growth.  The  authorities  had 
nothing  to  do  with  the  deficit.  The  monetary  school 
rejected  this  argument  on  the  grounds  that  the  govern- 
ment  possessed-the  power  to  reduce  its  real  expenditures 
and,  moreover,  that  the  authorities  had  deliberately  en- 
gaged  in  deficit  spending  for  several  years  prior  to  the 
hyperinflation  thus  establishing  the  monetary  precondi- 
tions  essential  to  that  episode. 
bank  had  overissued  the  currency.  He  also  flatly 
denied  that  the  Reichsbank’s  discount  rate  of  90 
percent  was  too  low  although  the  market  rate  on 
short  term  loans  was  an  astronomical  7,300  percent 
per  annum.16 
Characteristics  of  the  Balance  of  Payments 
School  It  is  instructive  at  this  point  to  identify 
the  chief  characteristics  of  the  German  balance  of 
payments  school  if  only  because  some  of  these  char- 
acteristics  survive  in  vestigial  form  in  popular  dis- 
cussion  of  the  fall  of  the  dollar.  First,  members  of 
the  school  tended  to  adhere  to  superficial  supply  and 
demand  explanations  of  the  exchange  rate.  Some 
merely  asserted  that  the  exchange  rate  is  determined 
by  supply  and  demand  without  saying  what  influ- 
ences  supply  and  demand.  Others  specified  certain 
autonomous  real  factors  affecting  the  balance  of  pay- 
ments  as  the  underlying  determinants  of  foreign 
exchange  supply  and  demand.  None recognized 
that  relative  price  levels  and/or  relative  money  stocks 
might  also  play  a  role.  These  variables  were  effec- 
tively  excluded  from  the  balance  of payments  school’s 
list  of  exchange  rate  determinants. 
The  school’s  second  characteristic  was  its  tendency 
to  identify  exchange  depreciation  with  one  or  two 
items  in  the  balance  of  payments.  In  particular, 
members  singled  out  raw  material  imports  as  the 
culprit  just  as  some  analysts  currently  blame  petrol- 
eum  imports.  Third,  they  tended  to  treat  the  items 
in  the  balance  of  payments  as  predetermined  and 
independent  when  in  fact  they  are  interdependent 
variables  determined  by  prices  and  the  exchange  rate. 
For  example,.  they  asserted  that  Germany’s  import 
requirements  were  irreducible  regardless  of price  and 
that  her  exports  were  likewise  fixed.  They  then 
extended  this  reasoning  to  the  other  accounts  of  the 
balance  of  payments.  Fourth,  they  denied  the  oper- 
ation  of  a  balance  of  payments  adjustment  mecha- 
nism.  This  denial  followed  from  their  assumption 
that  both  the  balance  of  payments  and  the  exchange 
rate  are  exogenously  determined  by  factors  that  are 
independent  of  money,  prices,  and  the  exchange  rate 
itself.  This  assumption  permitted  no  equilibrating 
feedback  effects  from  the  exchange  rate  to  the  bal- 
ance  of  payments.  M.  J.  Bonn,  a  prominent  balance 
of payments  theorist,  expressed  the  point  as follows.17 
Suppose,  he  said,  that  import  contraction  is  impos- 
16 Leland  Yeager,  International  Monetary  Relations: 
Theory,  History,  and  Policy,  2nd  edition,  (New  York: 
Harper  and  Row,  1976),  p.  314. 
17 Bonn’s  views  are  discussed  in  Paul  Einzig,  The  His- 
tory  of  Foreign  Exchange  (London:  MacMillan,  1962), 
pp.  271-272,  and  Ellis,  op.  cit.,  pp.  248-252. 
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materials  and  foodstuffs.  Likewise  export  expansion 
is  impossible  because  of  tariff  barriers  and  economic 
depression  abroad.  Now  assume  a  disturbance  that 
produces  a deficit  in Germany’s  trade  balance  thereby 
causing  an  exchange  rate  depreciation  of  the  mark 
relative  to  its  purchasing  power  parity  equilibrium. 
According  to  Cassel  and  his  school,  the  depreciation 
should,  by  lowering  the  foreign  price  of  German 
exports  and  raising  the  domestic  price  of her  imports, 
spur  the  former  and  check  the  latter  thereby  restor- 
ing  equilibrium  in  the  trade  balance.  But  these  price- 
induced  readjustments  in  trade  are  impossible  when 
imports  and  exports  are  independent  of  exchange 
rate  changes.  In  such  a  case,  an  adverse  trade  bal- 
ance  may  persist  in  the  face  of  an  undervalued  cur- 
rency,  contrary  to  the  conclusion  of  the  monetary 
school.  Finally,  the  fifth  characteristic  of the  German 
balance  of  payments  school  was  its  categorical  re- 
jection  of  the  proposition  that  money  influences 
prices  and  the  exchange  rate.  As  previously  men- 
tioned,  this  antimonetarist  view  was  implicit  in  the 
school’s  reverse  causation,  money  shortage,  and  real 
bills  doctrines. 
The  Monetary  School’s  Critique  Members  of  the 
monetary  school  had  little  trouble  exposing  the  falla- 
cies  in  these  views.  They  noted  that  supply  and  de- 
mand  constitute  only  the  proximate  determinants  of 
the  exchange  rate,  that  the  ultimate  determinants 
are  the  factors  underlying  supply  and  demand  them- 
selves,  and  that  these  factors  include  relative  price 
levels  determined  by  relative  money  stocks.  They 
pointed  out  that  the  components  of  the  balance  of 
payments  are  variables  not  constants,  that  they  are 
determined  simultaneously  by  prices  and  the  ex- 
change  rate,  and  that  exchange  rate  movements  pri- 
marily  reflect  monetary  pressure  on  the  entire  bal- 
ance  of  payments  rather  than  nonmonetary  disturb- 
ances  to  particular  accounts.  Regarding  the  repara- 
tions  account,  they  noted  that  the  depreciation  of  the 
mark  was  not  caused  by  these  payments  per  se  but 
rather  by  the  inflationary  way  they  were  financed, 
i.e.,  by  fresh  issues  of  paper  money.  As  for  Ger- 
many’s  alleged  need  for  a  fixed  physical  quantity  of 
imports  regardless  of  price,  they  argued  that  needs 
are  not  incompressible  and  that  even  the  import 
demand  for  absolute  necessities  possesses  some  price 
elasticity.  Moreover,  they  pointed  out  that  exports 
too  are  responsive  to  changes  in  relative  prices  and 
that  the  exchange  rate  mechanism  would  therefore 
tend  to  equilibrate  exports  and  imports  were  it  not 
continually  frustrated  by  inflation.  They  maintained 
that  had  domestic  prices  stopped  rising,  a  further 
depreciation  of  the  mark  would,  by  making  German 
goods  cheaper  to  foreigners  and  foreign  goods 
dearer  to  Germans,  have  stimulated  exports  and  re- 
strained  imports  until  a new  equilibrium  was  reached. 
In  their  view,  it  was  only  the  rise  in  domestic  prices 
consequent  upon  the  increase  in  the  money  supply 
that  prevented  the  expansion  of  exports  and  the  con- 
traction  of imports.  Otherwise  current  account  equi- 
librium  would  have  been  restored  by  the  exchange- 
induced  shift  in  the  relative  prices  of  exports  and 
imports. 
Most  important,  advocates  of  the  monetary  ap- 
proach  argued  convincingly  that  exchange  depreci- 
ation  originated  in  excessive  money  growth  and  that 
the  monetary  authorities  could  have  stopped  the  de- 
preciation  had  they  been  willing  to  exercise  control 
over  the  money  stock.  In  short,  they  showed  that 
the  price  of  foreign  exchange  could  not  have  risen 
indefinitely  unless  sustained  by  inflationary  money 
growth.  Had  the  latter  ceased,  the  exchange  rate 
would  have  stabilized. 
The  Expectations  Element  The  German  inflation 
controversy  contributed  the  last  of  the  three  major 
elements  to  the  monetary  approach.  The  English 
bullionist  writers  had  already  established  the  quan 
tity  theory  and  purchasing  power  parity  elements. 
All  that  remained  was  the  statement  and  develop- 
ment  of  the  expectations  theory  linking  anticipations 
of  future  money  supplies  with  the  current  exchange 
rate.  This  step  was  taken  during  the  hyperinflation 
debate  when  the  monetary  school  sought  to  explain 
why  the  dollar/mark  exchange  rate  actually  rose 
faster  than  the  German  money  supply.  According  to 
the  strict  quantity  theory  and  purchasing  power 
parity  hypotheses,  the  two  variables  should  rise  at 
roughly  the  same  rate.  Their  failure  to  do  so  was 
taken  by  the  balance  of  payments  school  as  consti- 
tuting  evidence  of  the  invalidity  of  the  monetary 
approach.  Advocates  of  the  monetary  approach, 
however,  rescued  it  from  this  criticism  by  explaining 
the  exchange  rate-money  growth  disparity  in  terms 
of  market  expectations.  In  a  nutshell,  they  con- 
tended  that  in  disequilibrium  the  exchange  rate  is 
influenced  by  the  expected  future  exchange  rate  (i.e., 
the  anticipated  purchasing  power  parity)  which  de- 
pends  on  prospective  price  levels  governed  by  ex- 
pected  money  stocks.  Howard  Ellis,  in  his  German 
Monetary  Theory  1905-1933  (1934),  cites  several 
economists,  notably  Gustav  Cassel,  Walter  Eucken, 
Fritz  Machlup,  Ludwig  von  Mises,  Melchior  Palyi, 
A.  C.  Pigou,  and  Dennis  Robertson,  who  claimed 
that  exchange  rate  movements  reflected  anticipated 
increases  in  the  money  stock  and  who  argued  that 
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to  the  expected  future  quantity  of  money  rather  than 
to  the  actual  current  quantity.  In  sum,  observers 
watching  the  money  supply  accelerate  month  after 
month  naturally  came  to  expect  future  money  growth 
to  exceed  present  money  growth  and  these  expecta- 
tions  caused  the  exchange  rate  to  outpace  the  money 
supply. 
Similar  explanations  were  advanced  to  account  for 
disparities  between  the  rate  of  domestic  price  infla- 
tion  and  the  rate  of  currency  depreciation  in  Ger- 
many.  Eucken,  Machlup,  and  von  Mises  argued 
that  the  exchange  rate  embodies  inflationary  expec- 
tations  and  that  exchange  rate  movements  parallel 
movements  in  expected  future  prices,  not  actual  cur- 
rent  prices.  For  this  reason,  they  claimed,  the 
exchange  rate  may  deviate  from  the  purchasing 
power  parity  computed  from  current  price  levels. 
Cassel  perhaps  put  the  matter  most  clearly  when  he 
wrote  that 
A  depreciation  of  currency  is  often  merely  an 
expression  for  discounting  an  expected  fall  in  the 
currency’s  internal  purchasing  power.  The  world 
sees  that  the  process  of  inflation  is  continually 
going  on,  and  that  the  condition  of  State  finances, 
for  instance,  is  rendering  a  continuance  of  the 
depreciation  of  money  probable.  The  international 
valuation  of  the  currency  will,  then,  generally 
show  a  tendency  to  anticipate  events,  so  to  speak, 
and  becomes  more  an  expression  of  the  internal 
value  the  currency  is  expected  to  possess  in  a  few 
months,  or  perhaps  in  a  year’s  time.18 
As  this  passage  suggests,  members  of  the  mone- 
tary  school  not  only  explained  how  expectations 
affect  the  exchange  rate,  but  also  how  expectations 
themselves  are  determined.  In  essence,  they  said  that 
people  base  their  exchange  rate  expectations  on  ob- 
servations  of  the  behavior  of  the  policy  authorities, 
especially  the  latter’s  monetary  and  fiscal  response  to 
large  budgetary  commitments  like  reparations  pay- 
ments.  These  observations  yield  information  about 
the  authorities’  policy  strategy  which  people  use  in 
predicting  future  policy  actions  affecting  the  exchange 
rate.  As  Dennis  Robertson  put  it  in  his  famous 
textbook  Money  (1922),  “.  .  .  the  actual  rate  of 
exchange  is  largely  governed  by  the  expected  be- 
havior  of  the  country’s  monetary  authority  .  .  ."19 
In  the  case  of  Germany,  the  authorities  were  already 
demonstrating  a  pronounced  tendency  to  finance 
reparations  payments  with  budget  deficits  and  exces- 
sive  monetary  growth.  People  expected  this  policy 
to  continue  in  the  future  and  these  expectations  were 
embodied  in  the  exchange  rate.20 
Conclusion  This  article  has  surveyed  the  de- 
velopment  of  the  monetary  approach  to  the  exchange 
rate  in  three  historical  controversies  with  the  rival 
balance  of  payments  approach.  The  article  offers 
some  support  for  Sir  J.  R.  Hicks’s  argument  that 
monetary  theory,  unlike  other  branches  of  economic 
theory,  tends  to  be  influenced  by  historical  events 
and  episodes,  notably  severe  monetary  disturbances 
and  institutional  changes  that  alter  the  character  of 
the  monetary  system.21  In  the  case  of  the  monetary 
theory  of  the  exchange  rate,  at  least,  Hick’s  argu- 
ment  seems  validated.  For,  as  discussed  above,  the 
main  elements  of  the  monetary  approach  emerged 
from  controversies  triggered  by  currency,  price,  and 
exchange  rate  upheavals  following  the  suspension  of 
metallic  parities.  Specifically,  the  article  argues  that 
the  monetary  approach  originated  in  the  Swedish 
bullionist  controversy  of  the  1750’s,  that  its  quantity 
theory  and  purchasing  power  parity  components  were 
thoroughly  established  during  the  English  bullionist 
controversy  of  the  early  1800’s,  and  that  the  expec- 
tations  component  was  added  during  the  German 
inflation  debate  of  the  early  1920’s.  Thus  all  the 
elements  of  the  modern  monetary  approach  were 
firmly  in  place  by  the  mid-1920’s. 
19 Dennis  Robertson,  Money  (London  :  Cambridge  Uni- 
versity  Press,  1922),  p.  133. 
20 Expectations  were  not  the  only  factor  cited  by  the 
monetary  school  as  causing  the  exchange  rate  to  lead 
prices  and  money.  Another  was  currency  substitution, 
i.e.,  the  substitution  of  stable  dollars  for  unstable  marks 
in  German  residents’  transactions  and  asset  money  bal- 
ances. 
21 Sir  John  Hicks,  Critical  Essays  in  Monetary  Theory 
(London:  Oxford  University  Press,  1967),  pp.  156-158.  l8 Cassel,  op.  cit.,  pp.  149-150. 
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